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abstract 
Since 1951 the ministry of transport has been vested with sweeping authority to 
restrict entry and set prices in commercial trucking. Perhaps it could have used 
this authority to cartelize the industry. The weight of evidence holds that it 
did not do so. There is little to suggest that the standard price schedules 
which the MOT continues to publicize and periodically revise are anything more 
than suggestions, widely disregarded by commercial trucking firms. There are no 
economies or diseconomies of scale and firms have expanded until industry profits 
are exhausted. The changes in truck transport regulation introduced in 1991 were 
mainly directed at freeing a new activity, parcel delivery service, from 
regulatory constraints, and spreading some of the benefits to others in the 
industry. The principle remaining effect of truck transport regulation in Japan 
has been to impose a cost on private trucking operations (companies that use 
their own trucks to deliver their own merchandise) by legally barring them from 
also undertaking commercial business. If this restraint were to be lifted, the 
supply of trucking services would be enlarged and in the transition to a new 
(zero profit) equilibrium commercial truckers would suffer losses and some would 
exit. 
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1. Introduction. 
The Japanese trucking industry nicely epitomizes a curious aspect of 
regulation in Japan: Although many have remarked on the ubiquity, intrusiveness 
and inefficiency of government regulation in Japan, one searches nearly in vain 
for economic analyses of the actual effects of regulation in Japan. From 1951 
the Ministry of Transport was vested with sweeping authority to restrict entry 
and regulate prices in the trucking industry. Yet in spite of the annual flood 
of government reports on the industry's production, operating characteristics, 
and so on, there exist no estimates of how the performance of the industry might 
have been different in the absence of regulation. Contrast with the US is stark. 
A voluminous academic literature established that Interstate Commerce Commission 
restrictions on entry and pricing had effectively cartelized the trucking 
industry (from 1935 to 1980), and, as it turns out, accurately predicted the 
effects of deregulation on industry capital values and labor earnings. Since 
1991 the trucking industry of Japan has been subject to a revised set of 
regulations which nominally represent relaxation of government restraints on 
entry and pricing. Yet just as the effects of the original regulatory regime 
were unknown, so too the effects of change in regime remain unplumbed. The goal 
of this study is to analyze the effects of regulation (and 1991 changes in 
regulation) on prices and rents in Japan's trucking industry. What we discover 
is that truck transport regulation in Japan has not been nearly as costly, 
distorting, and intrusive as it was in the US. 
Regulation has not produced a sweeping cartelization of truck transport in 
Japan, as it did in the US. The changes in truck transport regulation introduced 
in 1991 were mainly directed at freeing a new activity, parcel delivery service, 
from regulatory constraints, and spreading some of the benefits to others in the 
industry. The principle remaining effect of truck transport regulation in Japan 
has been to impose a cost on private trucking operations (companies that use 
their own trucks to deliver their own merchandise) by legally barring them from 
also undertaking commercial business. Commercial truckers have expanded their 
own operations until industry profits are exhausted. The end result is a system 
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in which private truckers undertake less commercial business than is economically 
efficient and commercial truckers undertake more. Further relaxation of truck 
transport regulation in Japan would reduce the number of empty trucks on the 
roadways there but would not lead to a significant reduction in fares. 
One of the keys to analysis of Japan's truck transport industry is its 
absence of economies of scale, which below we document with estimates of cost 
functions. The picture that emerges is an industry in which rents are exhausted, 
subject to the regulatory constraints. When parcel delivery service rapidly 
developed in the 1980's and the regulatory constraints began to impose large and 
visible deadweight costs, the competition among political pressure groups forced 
a change, just as Becker's (1983) theory anticipated. And as Peltzman's (1976) 
theory anticipated, in the movement from one political equilibrium to another, 
the benefits got spread among pressure groups, not concentrated solely on one. 
2. Trucking regulations of Japan. 
Regulation of truck transport in Japan originated during the Occupation era. 
The Railway Express Enterprise Law of 1949 established price and entry regulation 
of the trucking services connected with rail shipments. The Road Transportation 
Law of 1951 divided remaining commercial trucking firms into two categories, 
route truckers and area truckers. Route truckers were licensed to serve 
particular routes on regular timetables, and were permitted to serve customers 
on a less than truckload basis. That is multiple shipments could be combined on 
the same truck. The area truckers were licensed to serve one customer at a time 
on consignment within a designated region. That is they were permitted to offer 
shipments on a full truckload basis only. Besides these, specialized vehicles 
such as refrigerator trucks, tank trucks, and hearses are in a distinct category 
but their numbers are small in comparison to the others. Amendments to the laws 
in 1971 abolished the distinction between area truckers and those offering 
services connected with rail shipments, leaving intact the distinction between 
area truckers and route truckers. 
The number of route trucking firms (less-than-truckload firms) has steadily 
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declined from 533 in 1960 to 325 in 1989 (See table 1.). Area trucking firms 
(general trucking firms) tend to be smaller than route truckers and their numbers 
have steadily risen over the years from 28,523 in 1975 to 35,888 in 1989 (Again, 
see table 1). Area trucks account for more than 80 percent of the operating 
income of commercial trucks. Parcel delivery service is conducted by route 
trucking firms. The rapid growth of parcel delivery service beginning about 1985 
led to enactment in December 1989 of the Motor Vehicle Law, a complete revamping 
of truck transport regulation which took effect in 1991. The new statute 
abolished licensing {menkyo) of commercial truck firms and instated a permit 
(kyoka) system. Under the new system, the firms formerly holding route trucking 
licenses were no longer required to adhere to fixed time schedules nor make pick-
ups and deliveries at pre-set locations. Parcels could now be picked up and 
delivered at the customers' own premises rather than only at dropsites stipulated 
in MOT licenses—the troublesome feature of the earlier regime which elicited 
effective political opposition to it. The new permits specify geographic regions 
of operation but the companies specializing in parcel delivery hold in effect 
nation-wide coverage of permits. Additionally, the former holders of area 
trucking licenses now have been issued permits that allow them to combine 
shipments of differing customers (less-than-truckload shipments). In principle 
the permits now held by route trucking firms and area trucking firms no longer 
differ. However, there does still exist a de-facto distinction between the two 
types of firms. Long distance shipping including parcel delivery is mainly 
confined to the firms with networks of terminals. These, the former holders of 
route trucking licenses, are still referred to in the industry and in government 
surveys as the "less-than-truckload" companies (tokubetsu tsumiawase) . The 
others, including mostly former holders of area licenses, are referred to as 
"general" trucking firms (ippan). 
A significant portion of truck transport in Japan has always been for 
private use and therefore not regulated. Many large companies in Japan deliver 
their own merchandise rather than hiring the services of commercial truckers. 
Private trucks account for nearly two thirds of goods shipped by truck in Japan, 
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by weight, but account for only about one fourth of shipments measured by ton-
kilometers (See table 3). Private trucks tend to ship goods over shorter 
distances than do commercial trucks. The percentage of tonnage shipped by 
private truckers rather than commercial ones shows a slight secular trend 
downward over the last fifteen years. Though not regulated, private truckers are 
required to notify the MOT of their operations and are effectively prohibited 
from obtaining authorization to also transact commercial trucking business 
(though they have devised ways of getting around this prohibition, about which 
more, shortly). 
At the time the Motor Vehicle Law was enacted it was widely hailed as a 
relaxation of regulation (kisei kanwa). Partly this is because, as already 
indicated, route truckers were no longer confined to pre-set time schedules and 
drop sites and area truckers were no longer restricted to full truckload 
shipments. Additionally, regulation of fares was nominally relaxed. The 1989 
Motor Vehicle Law changed the method of price regulation from one in which the 
MOT stipulated legal minimum and maximum fares to one in which firms are only 
obliged to notify the MOT of fare changes, which it may disallow. Under the 
earlier regime of the 1951 Road Transport Law the MOT published standard rate 
schedules which beginning in the mid-1970's it revised every couple of years. 
The schedules specified ranges within which prices could legally be set, 
generally allowing deviations of about 10% above or below set amounts that 
depended on distance and weight in the case of route trucks, and depended on 
truck size and either time in transit or weight of load in the case of area 
trucks (whichever was the least binding constraint). A 1972 survey of 157 route 
trucking transactions and 410 area trucking transactions found that actual prices 
were below the legal minimum in many instances.1 Fronthauls were generally 
priced within ten percent of standard rates but backhauls were discounted by 
about thirty percent below standard rates. Many commentators have suggested that 
price regulation under the Road Transport Law exhibited a degree of softness, but 
'T. Murao, torakku unyu shijou kouzou no ichisokumen to unchin no jittai 
(one-sided structure of the truck transport market and the actual condition of 
rates), nittsuu sougou kenkyuujou...discussed in Murao (1982), p. 97 and p.320. 
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without presenting evidence.2 The 1989 Law in effect acknowledges softness of 
price regulation as the status quo. 
The substitution of a "permit" (kyoka) system for one of licenses (menkyo) 
means that all applicants meeting a set of published criteria will now be allowed 
entry, whereas before, the MOT was authorized to bar entry or bar expansion of 
service by incumbents, more or less arbitrarily. There does exist some fudge 
wording in the 1989 Law authorizing the MOT to bar further entry if it deems that 
"competition is excessive", but so far it has not invoked this clause. The 
published criteria for obtaining a permit include minimum truck fleet sizes, 
ranging from 3 trucks to 15 trucks (These vary among the 10 MOT regional 
offices), with the added stipulation that the trucks are owned rather than 
leased. Also, there are stipulations regarding adequate office facilities, 
parking, employment of qualified personnel and so on. In the case of area 
trucking all this might actually represent a hardening of entry regulation rather 
than softening. In any event, expansion by incumbents is likely to have 
exhausted whatever rents are conferred by restriction of new entry. As we 
document below, the industry does not exhibit economies of scale so expansion by 
incumbents is no more costly than new entry. And expansion by incumbents under 
both the old regime and the current one has often not required the issuance of 
new licenses or permits. 
The factor which precipitated enactment of the 1989 Law was growth of the 
parcel delivery service. The transport ministry does not report income from 
parcel delivery separately from that of other commercial truckers but (as noted 
by Saitou, 1991, p. 45) an article in nikkei shinbun indicated that in 1985 the 
revenues from private parcel delivery amounted to 323,000 million yen, 
approximately 27.9% of the operating income of route trucking firms as a group, 
and 4.4% of the operating income of all commercial trucks.3 From 1985 to 1990 
2Refer for example to the following: Goto and Sugiyama (1983); Sugiyama 
(1989); Takahashi (1990); and Takeuchi and Terada (1995). 
3takuhaibin unchin no subete (all about parcel delivery service fares), 
nikkei shinbun, November 20, 1985. 
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the number of parcels delivered by route truckers doubled (See table 4). 
Assuming, rather conservatively, that revenue per parcel was unchanged from the 
655 yen/parcel received in 1985, this would mean that in 1990 parcel delivery 
accounted for nearly 40% of the operating income of less-than-truckload truckers 
and nearly 7 percent of the operating income of all truckers. In the last ten 
years, parcel delivery service has been by far the most rapidly growing segment 
of commercial trucking. 
The growth of parcel delivery service in Japan mirrored the expansion of 
Federal Express and United Parcel Service in the US. In Japan, Yamato unyu 
(takkyuu-bin) was the innovator and it retains its dominance of the industry. 
Yamato and its three subsidiaries accounted for 44.3% of parcel deliveries in 
1993 followed by nippon tsuun (perikan-bin) and its 22 related companies with 
26.2%. The Yamato logo, a black cat carrying its kitten in its mouth, has become 
a very familiar sight on trucks all over Japan. Beginning around 1980 Yamato 
began to introduce parcel delivery service in a major way, based on a 
constellation of innovations:4 (1) A nationwide system of truck terminals, 
extending a logistical net throughout the country and enabling next-day delivery 
over an extremely wide region. (2) Wireless communication directly with truck 
drivers while enroute ("multichannel access"). (3) Computerization of 
instructions and tracking of parcels. (4) Linkage of computer networks with one 
another ("value-added networks"). Within a few years, these innovations were 
imitated by nittsuu and others. The improvement in logistics and communications 
which these innovations supported, had made it cost effective to greatly increase 
the number of dropsites on truck routes, and to offer customers assurances of 
special handling or express delivery. 
By 1985, parcel delivery service was becoming a major rival to postal parcel 
delivery service and had virtually displaced parcel shipment by rail. But the 
regulation of route trucking was ill suited to the new activity in several ways. 
First, the route licenses bound the trucks to specified stops, often at retail 
''The excellent little book by Saitou (1991), describes these innovations in 
detail. 
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stores such as rice shops or liquor stores, while the new technology had made it 
economical to offer door-to-door pick-up and delivery. Second, even Yamato, the 
holder of the most kilometers of licensed routes was still unable to offer 
nationwide parcel delivery without further acquisition of licenses or 
subcontracting out to firms that already held licenses. And finally, the 
standard pricing schedules of the MOT were poorly adapted to parcels as small as 
those the route truckers were now transporting—the sensible way of pricing 
parcel delivery was by the item, not by weight. 
From 1983 to 1988 Yamato greatly expanded its network by acquiring other 
route companies to obtain their licenses, and by obtaining new licenses, but it 
was frustrated in its attempts to achieve truly nationwide coverage. In 
particular, in Yamagata prefecture, incumbent holders of route licenses 
successfully opposed Yamato's application to obtain licenses there (Saitou, 1991; 
pp. 141-147). Only the enactment of the 1989 Act resolved matters in Yamato's 
favor, and at the same instant it largely removed the other onerous regulatory 
constraints on parcel delivery service also—at least this was true for Yamato. 
A couple of other occurrences, germane to the expansion of parcel delivery 
service in Japan also merit comment. About 1988 the American company Federal 
Express sought and obtained permission to deliver parcels to Japan and deliver 
them within Japan. The granting of these rights to FedEx had been requested by 
the US government with clear linkage to the ongoing trade negotiations.5 Foreign 
pressure to relax regulatory constraints on parcel delivery were thus added to 
domestic pressure. 
And finally, in February 1992 the president and other top officials of Tokyo 
Sagawa kyuubin were arrested and charged with extending fraudulent loans of more 
than 30-billion yen (more than 200-million $US) to affiliates of the Inagawa 
crime syndicate. The money was being funnelled to 100 politicians in the Liberal 
Democratic Party, including S. Kanemaru, the head of a leading faction. It was 
subsequently reported that among the intended objects of the bribery was the 
5On the chronology of Federal Expresses attempts to gain these concessions 
refer to Ligon (1993). 
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successful disposition of Sagawa's application to greatly expand its licensed 
area. Sagawa's parcel delivery service remains quite minor relative to the 
industry leaders. This leads directly to a fundamental question regarding the 
effects of truck transport regulation: Has it produced a stream of economic 
rents? The answer is a resounding: maybe, but not a very large stream. 
3. Evidence of economic rent. 
One of the most convincing demonstrations that US trucking regulation 
generated cartel rents was that permits themselves were bought and sold at 
sizeable prices, about a third of the amount of annual revenue generated by the 
business which the permit allowed (Moore (1978); Frew (1981)). The market value 
of permits represents a pure rent, (one which accrues not necessarily to the 
current permit holders but rather to the happy few who were first issued the 
valuable permits without having had to pay for them). The prices at which 
permits were transferred were reported to the US regulatory authorities, and 
therefore became a matter of public record subject to the scrutiny of economists 
and others. 
There exists evidence that trucking permits in Japan too have been traded, 
and hold a market value which is the capitalization of rent. But unlike the US 
case, the prices at which permits have been traded are not at all a matter of 
public record. Murao (1982; table 7-18, p. 323) lists the number of instances 
annually from 1964 through 1980 in which area trucking licenses and route 
trucking licenses were transferred from one party to another (Murao obtained the 
unpublished data from the MOT). For instance in 1980, 323 area truck licenses 
and 4 route licenses were transferred and these numbers are fairly typical of the 
other years too. Murao (p. 110) suggests that the majority of these instances 
were the result of mergers or bankruptcies which also epitomizes the sale of 
truck licenses under the US regulatory regime. Unfortunately, the prices at 
which these licenses were transferred was apparently not reported to the MOT. 
But the fact that these transfers occurred at all evidences the market value of 
the licenses. Why bother obtaining a license from its current holder rather than 
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obtaining one gratis from the MOT unless the latter avenue was thwarted? 
A further hint of the market for trucking licenses in Japan is an item from 
a trade publication. Okano (1979, p. 76) notes that around 1970 a route trucker 
based in Shizuoka prefecture and exiting from the industry was unsuccessful in 
finding a buyer for his license. This was reported in an industry daily under 
the headline "route trucking licenses already valueless". As Okano remarks, this 
could only have been newsworthy if in general or prior to this the licenses were 
not valueless; perhaps that particular route was poorly situated. On the other 
hand, saleable licenses exist in Japan for shipping routes on coastal waterways 
and for taxis, and the markets in which these licenses are traded are relatively 
open. The market for trucking licenses is remarkable by its near absence. 
Besides the outright sale of licenses, we should also consider the 
possibilities of indirect leasing of them which may equally evidence that the 
licenses hold market value. A common practice in the Japanese trucking industry 
is referred to as "commissioning of vehicles" (in Japanese, yousha, written with 
the same Chinese character as used in the Japanese word for mercenary soldier: 
youhei). The difference between the commission payments to hired trucks and 
drivers and revenues received includes the pro rata rent accruing to the holder 
of the license. The standard industry practice has been and continues to be to 
pay commissioned trucks and drivers 90 percent of the revenues their service 
generates, the licenseholder/permitholder retaining 10 percent. But this is 
comparable to the percentage of revenues awarded to freight forwarders and thus 
represents essentially no economic rent. Under the pre-1980 US regulatory 
regime, the analogous transfer payment from private (unlicensed) backhaulers to 
licenseholders was as much as 20 to 30 percent of revenues (Robyn (1987, pp. 19-
20). It seems from this that the rent value of trucking licenses/permits is 
considerably less under the Japanese regulations than under the old US ones, 
possibly even zero or nearly so. This does not imply that commercial truckers 
would suffer no economic losses if the regulations were abolished. Under the 
status quo, private truckers in Japan are legally enjoined from offering 
commercial services. If this restraint were to be lifted, the supply of trucking 
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services would be enlarged and in the transition to a new (zero profit) 
equilibrium commercial truckers would suffer losses and some would exit. 
Because private truckers mainly deliver merchandise to customers, most of 
their transport is unidirectional, and the empty return trips simply add to their 
costs of delivery. They could lower their costs by supplying their backhaul 
services to others but under the Japanese regulations they can only legally 
transport their own goods, not those of third parties. Nor according to the 
letter of the law are commercial truckers permitted to hire the backhaul services 
of private truckers, for in the case of one company commissioning a vehicle (and 
driver) from another company, both companies are required to hold licenses 
pertaining to the business at hand. Ways have been found of getting around these 
onerous restrictions, but they may not be very common. 
A sort of ruse has become widely remarked. A private trucker, technically 
speaking, "leases" its trucks and maintenance services to the drivers who are 
then free — a s individuals— to enter their own contracts with licensed truck 
companies without violating the law (Murao, 1982, pp. 220-221). Others have 
blatantly ignored the regulations altogether, offering services illegally, sans 
permit as so-called shiro toora (lit. blank trucks, i.e. trucks with blank or 
nonexistent permit numbers). The MOT and the Japan Truck Association continue 
to regard blank trucks as a problem (because they pose a threat to public safety, 
maintain the officials of these entities). 
Just how common it is for private truckers to evade restrictions on their 
supplying commercial services on the side is difficult to say. But judging from 
statistics on empty backhauls it may not be very common at all. The percentage 
of kilometers run which are under load is a measure of the extent of empty 
backhauls. For trucks that are used only to transport goods, not for commuting, 
errands and so on, a value of this statistic of .5 would indicate all backhauls 
are empty. In fact, this is very nearly the case for ordinary (not small-sized) 
private trucks (See table 5a). Ordinary commercial trucks apparently experience 
empty backhauls approximately two-thirds of the time (percentage of kilometers 
which are under load = .68 (See tables 5a, 5b, and 5c). This points to a 
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possible deadweight loss from regulation. We will return to this point in our 
final assessment of truck transport regulation in Japan. But before attempting 
a final assessment, we accumulate more facts about the industry, based on 
estimates of cost functions. 
4. Cost function estimates. 
Estimates of cost functions for Japanese trucking firms reveal several 
things. First, neither area trucking firms nor route trucking firms exhibit 
scale economies. Second, trucking firms experienced virtually no cost-reducing 
innovation during the 1980's. Third, area trucking firms based in Tokyo and 
Osaka have significantly higher costs of transporting goods than do others, 
controlling for the effects of input prices. And finally, area trucking firms 
experienced no significant shift in cost functions coincident with the 1990 
changes in regulation. 
The cost functions we estimate here are of the following sort: 
where c=cost per firm, y=output per firm, t=characteristics of output, and w= a 
vector of factor prices. Output y is defined as metric tons shipped. Of course 
a given increment of output defined in this way encompasses heterogeneous 
activities. Accordingly, we shall suppose that the costs of "output" depend also 
on additional characteristics of the transport process: t,=metric tons per truck-
day, and t2=kilometers under load per truck-day. For given output as defined 
here, these two desiderata fairly narrowly circumscribe the number of trips per 
day, the average distance per haul, and the average weight per load, none of 
which were observed directly. 
For local trucks, we observe data averaged over firms in each of nine 
geographic regions of Japan annually from 1981 through 1993. For route trucks, 
we observe data averaged over firms in each of five categories of truck fleet 
size, annually from 1981 through 1990. The source of data for both route 
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truckers and area truckers, 1980-1990 is: unyushou jidousha koutsu kyoku soumuka 
(general affairs section, automotive transport bureau, ministry of transport, 
government of Japan), jidousha unsou jigyou keiei shihyou (indicators of 
automotive transport enterprise management), annual. The sample of firms in this 
source includes trucking firms that in 1964 derived more than half of their 
income from this business and in each year a random sample of firms in the 
smallest category (fewer than 20 trucks). And from 1991-1993, the data on area 
trucks are from: zen nihon torakku kyoukai (Japan truck association) keiei 
bunseki houkoku sho (management analysis report). The sample on which this 
source is based excludes companies that rely extensively on commissioned 
vehicles; it favors somewhat smaller firms than the source of data for the 
earlier years.6 
The factors of production are labor, fuel and capital. The wage rate is 
computed as the compensation per employee. The fuel price is proxied by 
expenditures on fuel per thousand kilometers travelled. Capital expenses 
represent the expenses allocated to depreciation, maintenance, and repairs plus 
five percent of the book value of tangible assets. The remaining portion of 
operating costs, largely representing commission payments for purchased 
transportation, were allocated on a pro-rata basis to labor, fuel and capital in 
the same proportions as the other costs. The capital price is computed as 
capital expenses (i.e. depreciation, maintenance, and repairs plus five percent 
of the book value of tangible assets) relative to the book value of tangible 
assets. 
The specific form we estimate is the following7: 
Unfortunately the break occurs with the change in regulations. After 1990 
the MOT ceased reporting cost data on firms in the separate categories of route 
trucking and area trucking as it did before. 
7We also attempted to estimate transcendental logarithmic cost functions of 
the sort reported by Friedlaender and Spady (1981) for US trucking firms, and 
report the results of one of these. See the appendix for compete details. 
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where the aT are time effects, and the aF are firm-type effects (Firm types are 
distinguished by geographic region in the case of area trucks and by truck fleet 
size in the case of route trucks). The coefficient k (=dln c/dln y), known as 
the cost "flexibility", indicates the degree of scale economies in production (If 
X>1 there exist diseconomies of scale, and if A.<1 there are economies of scale). 
We follow a standard procedure and estimate the cost function jointly with 
factor share equations, derived by applying Shephard's lemma to the cost 
function8: 
The fact that cost shares sum to one causes the system to be overdetermined. To 
state the point a little differently, if we estimate the system with one of the 
cost share equations removed; the remaining one is uniquely determined. 
The tables 6 and 7 display estimates of the cost functions of route trucking 
firms and area trucking firms, respectively. The year dummies in the route 
trucking cost estimates indicate differences in intercept between 1980 and each 
other year in the sample. The firm-type dummies in the route trucking cost 
estimates indicate differences in intercept between firms with fewer than 20 
trucks and those with other fleet sizes. The year dummies in the are trucking 
cost estimates indicate differences in intercept between 1981 and each other year 
in the sample. The firm-type dummies in the area trucking cost estimates 
indicate differences in intercept between Sapporo and each other MOT region. The 
coefficients on the natural logarithms of factor prices equal the respective 
factor shares. 
The costs are sensitive to the characteristics of output. For given amount 
of tons transported, costs rise with metric tons per truck day and fall with 
kilometers per truck day. More tons per truck day means greater consolidation 
!Shephard's lemma holds that: din c/dln x} = W; X;/c. 
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of shipments. More kilometers per truck day means transport over a greater 
distance. Neither type of truck firm exhibits economies of scale: Cost 
flexibility is near unity in all the equations.9 
The firm-type effects were insignificant in the route truckers' costs, which 
is a further indication that scale economies are not present for these firms. 
Area truckers in Osaka and Tokyo exhibit higher costs than others. Perhaps these 
higher costs are related in some way to the urban density of these regions. 
The year dummies might be informative regarding technical change, and, in 
the case of area truckers, informative also regarding the effects on costs of 
regulatory changes adopted in 1990. First, consider technical change. There 
does not appear a downward trend or drift over time in the cost functions of 
either group during the period of observation. The individual dummies themselves 
are for the most part near zero and not statistically significant. Technical 
change is strikingly absent from these data. But what of the well-documented 
innovativeness of Yamato and other route truckers offering parcel delivery 
service in the 1980's? Almost certainly, Yamato is not in the data set (I am 
unable to confirm this but the remarkable growth in Yamato's output 1985-1990 
does not appear to be reflected in the data). 
In the case of area trucking firms, year dummies for 1991-1993 would pick 
up shifts in cost due to the changes beginning in 1991 permitting area truckers 
for the first time to consolidate the cargoes of differing customers. There is 
no dramatic shift apparent. 
This investigation of trucking cost functions has revealed an industry in 
which firms do not exhibit scale economies, and in which for the great mass of 
firms little cost-reducing innovation is apparent over the previous decade. 
Armed with these findings, we return our attention to the effects of regulation 
in this industry. 
9Our estimates can be compared with those of Chiba. In Chiba (1988) he 
constructed a divisia index of route trucking input prices 1971-1985, and in 
Chiba (1991) used this to estimate a simple translog cost function with output 
represented by tons shipped by the industry in each year. Chiba did find 
economies of scale (cost flexibility equalling about .5), but his estimate relies 
upon a much smaller sample than ours and he did not control for characteristics 
of output. 
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5. The economic effects of truck transport regulation and deregulation in Japan 
Since 1951 the ministry of transport has been vested with sweeping authority 
to restrict entry and set prices in commercial trucking. Perhaps it could have 
used this authority to cartelize the industry. The weight of evidence holds that 
it did not do so. A couple of antimonopoly cases are revealing on the 
ineffectiveness of price and entry regulations in this industry. In the Okayama 
truck association case (March 31, 1983, kankoku shinketsu), the 699 area truck 
companies in Okayama prefecture agreed among themselves (in January 1981) to 
limits on the sizes of truck fleets, and maximum weights of loads, and further 
agreed that applications by any of them to the MOT to obtain additional license 
or expand operations would first have to be submitted for approval of the 
association (Takimoto (1993), pp. 176-183). The Fair Trade Commission learned 
of these activities and found them to violate Japan's antimonopoly laws, and the 
association consented to cease the offending behavior. The significant point 
about this case is that in spite of the existing regulatory restrictions on 
pricing and entry, the Okayama truck association nevertheless perceived that 
collusive restrictions on productive capacity would be advantageous. Because of 
the absence of diseconomies of scale, the entry restriction in and of itself had 
very little impact on prices and profits. And apparently the MOT price 
regulations were not enforced, for if they were, restrictions on output would 
have been redundant. 
A second case involves the route trucker section of the Kanagawa 
prefecture truck association (March 31, 1989, bunshou kankoku). In this case, 
in January 1988 the route truckers based in Kanagawa prefecture agreed to a 
schedule of minimum prices, based on the standard price schedules announced by 
the MOT. In other words, the collusive prices would be automatically adjusted 
upward by the same percentage as any MOT adjustment in standard rates. The Fair 
Trade Commission investigated and learned that the truck associations of Nagano 
and Hiroshima prefectures had also engaged in similar behavior. All were found 
to have violated antimonopoly laws and agreed to desist (Takimoto (1993), pp.184-
189). Here is yet further evidence that price regulation has been ineffective 
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in the truck transport industry. 
We can now understand that the difficulties Yamato experienced in expanding 
its system of parcel delivery in the late 1980's represented a singular case in 
which the licensing of route truckers constrained growth. Up to that time 
regulation had not conferred monopoly rents on trucking firms nor significantly 
inhibited competitive pricing. Its one binding effect had been to constrict the 
ability of private truckers to offer commercial services. But with the growth 
of parcel delivery service, regulatory constraints began to bind in other places. 
Propelled by the American examples of Federal Express and United Parcel Service, 
Yamato, Nittsuu and others developed a product innovation that was highly 
successful, and profitable. So profitable in fact that beginning about 1983 
these began marketing products directly to consumers to increase the demand for 
their parcel service (Saitou (1993, pp. 100-106). As the parcel delivery service 
expanded, the distorting effects of regulation grew larger. As Yamato and others 
sought to establish nationwide logistical networks, route licenses in selected 
areas became valuable. The firms were prepared to offer door-to-door pickup and 
delivery service, utilizing wireless communication with drivers, but were 
constrained to follow set routes with predefined dropsites. And as customers 
learned of the convenience and cheapness of parcel service the regulatory 
distortions were becoming visible. 
Becker (1983) has cogently argued that deadweight losses from government 
policies have precisely the same effects as taxes on political pressure in 
support of the policies. By superior facility at political organization or 
effective rhetoric a pressure group may overcome the disadvantage which 
deadweight losses impose upon it, but without such a boost it is unlikely to 
prevail. Symmetrically, a pressure group in favor of a policy that eliminates 
a deadweight loss holds an inherent political advantage, which opposing factions 
must overcome if they are to thwart it. The relaxation of constraints on parcel 
delivery service relatively soon after its initial growth spurt eliminated 
deadweight losses which were growing and widely visible, and should therefore be 
regarded as unsurprising in light of Becker's theory. But the 1989 Motor Vehicle 
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Act contained other provisions besides those strictly related to parcel delivery 
service. To understand why, another theory is helpful. 
Peltzman (1979) developed some of the comparative static properties of 
political equilibrium. If a political decisionmaker is viewed as maximizing the 
intensity of support from all pressure groups, then rather than favoring one 
group to the exclusion of others it will spread rents among them, eliciting equal 
marginal increases in political support per dollar conferred on each. If a 
change in external circumstances confers additional possibility of government 
largess, then policies will be enacted that benefit the many rather than the few. 
In the opposite case, losses will be subdivided rather than concentrated. The 
relaxation of constraints on parcel delivery service eliminated deadweight 
losses. Parcel delivery firms experienced profits and as they expanded and 
pushed down prices, consumers benefitted. But the 1989 law also relaxed a 
constraint on area truckers, unnecessary to the freeing of parcel delivery 
service. Area truckers were enabled to take on less-than-truckload cargoes. (But 
we were unable to detect any shift in cost functions resulting form this, nor has 
their been any striking increase in metric-tons per truck day nor reduction in 
kilometers under load per truck-day for area truckers (See table 8a and 8b)). 
Additionally, by establishing minimum truck fleet sizes (owned and not leased) 
and other such preconditions for issuance of a permit the 1989 at least held the 
possibility of hardened entry requirements in area trucking. In particular this 
assured area truckers that the prohibition on private truckers from engaging in 
commercial business would be perpetuated, to the benefit of commercial truckers 
and detriment of consumers who would continue to suffer from inefficient 
organization of the trucking industry. As Peltzman's argument requires, the 
regulations were changed in a way to benefit the many. 
6. Conclusion. 
There is little to suggest that the standard price schedules which the MOT 
continues to publicize and periodically revise are anything more than 
suggestions, widely disregarded by commercial trucking firms. There are no 
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economies or diseconomies of scale and firms have expanded until industry profits 
are exhausted. The principle effect of entry restrictions has been to inhibit 
private truckers from offering commercial services on the side. Commercial 
truckers desire that this inhibition continue only because their prices and 
profits would temporarily dip if it were to be lifted. The private truckers 
desire that the restrictions on their undertaking commercial operations be 
lifted. Commercial truckers are better organized than private truckers. The 
Japan truck association has a national office in Tokyo and local chapters in each 
prefecture. The largest chapters such as the one in Osaka have a permanent staff 
of professional analysts and advocates. Private truckers by definition derive 
only a portion of their incomes from trucking operations and so represent a more 
diffused interest than commercial truckers. Consumers represent an even more 
diffused interest. Complete deregulation of trucking seems unlikely in the near 
future. 
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Appendix. Translog cost function. 
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Appendix table. Regression estimate of translog cost function; area truckers 1981-1993. 
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Table 1. Numbers of trucking companies. 
Table 2. Operating income of regulated trucking firms. units= millions of yen. 
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Table 3. Transport by trucks. 
23 
Table 4. Volume of parcels transported. units=10,000 parcels 
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Table 5a. Percentage of kilometers run which are under load (jissha ritsu). ordinary trucks (not small trucks) 
Table 5b. Percentage of kilometers run which are under load (jissha ritsu). area trucks. 
Table 5c. Percentage of kilometers run which are under load (jissha ritsu). route trucks. 
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Table 6. Regression estimates of cost functions; route truckers 1980-1990. 
26 
Table 7. Regression estimates of cost functions; area truckers 1981-1993. 
27 
Table 8a. metric tons per truck-day (t1), area trucks. 
Table 8b. kilometers per truck-day (t2), area trucks. 
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